We don't need no stinking great leaders...

When one gets through the self-deprecating humor and sarcasm (especially with his use of stupidity), fellow libertarian Penn Jillette makes some very good points as to why he thinks a great leader, in the sense that it has been currently defined (he looks to a new book written by The Cato Institute's Gene Healy for guidance - one on my reading list for sure) is not what we really need. I enjoyed the message, the humor and the way it has obviously gotten under the skin of certain commenters on that site.

Please read the whole thing but I'll summarize most of the good stuff here:

Everyone I talk to seems to think the president of the United States right now is stupid...

...They all seem to think we need to get a smarter guy in the White House fast, and Bush is so stupid, that task shouldn't be too hard...

...The idea, especially from the Democrats that I know, is, we just get a smarter guy in the White House, and all the problems will go away. We'll have smart speeches, smart high gas prices, smart bad economy, smart war on terrorism, smart war on drugs, smart hurricanes, smart global warming, smart war in Georgia -- smart, smart, smart...

...Obama is a great leader. He can fire people up and get them to do what he wants. He does smart speeches that promise everyone everything they need and make us feel good about our country and how much greater our government could be...

...But I don't think our next president being a great leader is a good thing...

...I'm worried about someone smarter than Bush taking over that tremendous power. Charisma and ambition increase my fear exponentially, and a great leader scares me to death...

...We need someone stupid enough to understand that the president of the United States can't solve many problems without taking away freedom and therefore shouldn't try. The only reason John McCain scares me a little less is because I think he's a little less likely to win. They both promise a government that will watch over us, and I don't like that...

..I don't want anyone as president who promises to take care of me. I may be stupid, but I want a chance to try to be a grown-up and take care of my family. Freedom means the freedom to be stupid, and that's what I want. I don't want anyone to feel my pain or tell me to ask what we can do for our country, or give us all money and take care of us...

...The choice shouldn't be which lesser of two evils should have the enormous power of our modern presidents. The question should be, who would do less as president? Who would leave us alone?...

Jillette's humorous commentary struck a chord with me because this is basically how I view things. My committments are to individual liberty, free markets and, perhaps most relevant to this discussion, limited government. Finding these attributes amongst our friends on either the Democratic or Republican side is difficult if not impossible. I am not interested in fancy speeches. I am not interested in broken campaign promises. I would be perfectly content to have a President that faithfully executed the laws of the United States in accordance with the Supreme Law of the Land. A President smart enough to recognize that there are limitations on what government can and should do and what government cannot and should not do would be satisfactory to me.

Jillette, rightly I think, fears the notion of a "great leader" because of the amount of power at that person's disposal, but let us not forget those who would rally around that leader. James Madison's writings on factions, most notably found in Federalist 10, are no less relevant today than they were over 200 years ago so it is worth quoting passages.

It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations. By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community...

...Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency...

...As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves...

...The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good...

...It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole...

I find election year politics painful. Intellectually, it's dull. Worse, having to hear every other minute that I am facing the most important election of my lifetime and, especially one for libertarians, that we better be ready to vote for the lesser of two evils or else be ready for [INSERT FEAR OF DEMOCRATIC/REPUBLICAN PRESIDENCY HERE] at least three times a day wore thin months ago (to the extent I had any patience for it). As far as the lesser of two evils (the last snippet from my quoted passage from Jillette's post), from my standpoint, whether I'm shot in the head at close range with a 9mm pistol or an AK-47 does not change the fact that I am royally screwed. It only determines the size of the hole in my head. That's how I view the nonsense about the lesser of two evils so neither Obama nor McCain gets my support.

The Morality of Relativism

Doing a stint at AOTP, our friend Cernig (of Newshoggers reknown) has a truly beautiful post on the history of what is perjoratively called moral relativism, and what it can teach us about the shared history of classical American political thought ranging from libertarianism to liberalism to Burkean conservatism to anarchism. Cernig's piece comes remarkably close to my own views, and is the very definition of a "Read the Whole Thing" post - especially if you have any interest in restoring the primacy of the classical American political tradition.

Cernig begins:

I did absorb enough moral philosophy to understand that the broad mainstream of modern Western political thought - libertarians, liberals, small-c conservatives and even anarchists - held a rather different conception of moral truth from that of the authoritarian streams - communism, fascism and religious conservativism. For the latter, moral certainty is easy to come by. It is handed down from an Invisible Friend who is never wrong or arrived at intuitively via a faith that they, and they alone, have access to Platonic truths about morality in unalloyed form. For the rest of us, its a bit harder to come by such certainty - we have to actually think about it a
bit.

Cernig goes on to discuss Wittgenstein and two Scots near and dear to libertarianism - Mill and Smith, amongst others. He argues that although as a practical matter the purpose of politics is the legislation of morality, as a normative matter the sole morality that should matter is the Golden Rule ("do unto others....") and its corrollary ("don't allow others to do unto you as you wouldn't do to them"). (See Note 1, below). This is because human knowledge is finite, and morality thus cannot be intuitively known except by reliance on an "Invisible Friend," be it the Bible, a political leader, or an author. Thus, he argues, "moral relativism is the only rational method of moral enquiry, one that doesn’t rely a priori on magical and mysterious access to Invisible Friends, be they deity or platonic form."

Cernig concludes:

This intellectual framework, arising out of moral relativism and the political theory which logically must follow from it, is the shared heritage of liberals, libertarians, moderate conservatives and even anarchists. We do not, however, share any of that heritage with those who appeal to Invisible Friends of various kinds for their moral authority. They all share an authoritarian outlook arising from their reliance on dogmatic and external unapproachables, whether on hard Left or hard Right, which cannot ever be compatible with our shared theories of liberty, freedom or morality.

Cernig's post is fertile territory for a lot of my own political philosophy.

Most importantly, Cernig's post focuses on the argument that "moral relativism" is the foundation upon which liberty and individual freedoms are based. I think this point is well-taken, particularly considering that humans and the whole of human accumulated knowledge are by definition, finite; however, somewhere in the universe exists an infinite entity, whether that entity be the universe, God, or something else. (See Note 2 below)

Where I struggle, however, is with the use of the term "moral relativism" to describe the humility that accepts the limits of human knowledge in a universe where an infinite entity exists. This may be due to my own discomfort with the way in which it is usually used as a perjorative, but I also think the term "moral relativism" is inaccurate. The point at which Cernig is driving, which is a beautiful point, is that while morality (aka "absolute truth") may in fact exist (and perhaps does exist by definition), it is unknowable with certainty due to the finite nature of human knowledge. Thus, humans can only act morally to the extent of their own frame of reference, and to advance their own happiness (not to be confused with pleasure - the two are not always or even often the same).

But that does not mean we give up the search for absolute truth or morality, unknowable as it may be. Rather our understanding that absolute truth exists but cannot be known with certainty causes us to constantly inquire as to the nature of that absolute truth, constantly seeking it out while simultaneously recognizing that our uncertainty leaves us in no position to order others what to do short of recognizing the Golden Rule and its corrollary, versions of which, to my knowledge, exist in all or nearly all human cultures throughout recorded history.

In this way, so-called "moral relativists" are not "relativists" at all - instead, our morality is entirely formed on the Golden Rule and its corrollary. The difference is that this morality recognizes that truth, to the extent it can be attained, can only be attained through rational inquiry. As such, the Golden Rule is the central morality, as it is necessary to protect and respect rational inquiry and the search for truth (by definition "doing unto others" in a way you would not have "done unto you" acts contrary to one's own, albeit limited, understanding of truth). Far from being "relativists," we seek to act consistently with this one rational and universal moral principle without exception (though, as fallible humans, we no doubt occasionally fail in that task).

Instead, I would posit, those that would seek to impose the will of their "Invisible Friend" on others through the use of government (or other forcible means) are the real relativists. In so doing, these groups must of necessity violate the Golden Rule, which, as I said, is perhaps universally accepted in some form or another. Their justification for violating the Golden Rule in order to impose their personal moral vision on others? The "Invisible Friend" said so. This to me is the very essence of true relativism, one in which any rule is subject to violation as long as some knowable (and therefore finite) entity says so, and in which morality is entirely based on the whims of that knowable (and therefore finite) entity. In such a system, truth and morality exist only to the extent of the source entity - they do not exist independent of the source entity.

This is of course hardly a novel point I am making. Indeed, in addition to Enlightment and post-Enlightenment thinkers, the argument that truth/morality exist independent of an "Invisible Friend" and that basing truth/morality on such an "Invisible Friend" is the truly relativist position dates at least to Socrates.

NOTE 1: My first inclination was to disagree with Cernig's statement that legislation of morality is the purpose of politics, until I realized that this was a positive rather than normative statement. As a matter of practical description, I think Cernig's probably right - as a practical matter, politics is almost entirely about legislating morality (i.e., using the power of government to punish perceived immoral behavior, whether it be through wealth redistribution, criminal punishment, or civil liability, the purpose of politics is to punish the so-called "evil-doers" and reward those deemed "good" by the ruling class). On a normative level, however, Cernig's really arguing that the sole purpose of politics "should" be enforcement of the Golden Rule and its corrollary- i.e., the Golden Rule and its corrollary are the only morality with which government "should" be concerned. On this point, you'd be hard-pressed to find a true libertarian who disagreed (and ultimately, I think most anarchists would also agree, though they would likely point out - with justification - that the very concept of government violates the Golden Rule).

NOTE 2: At the risk of sounding like a stoned physics/astronomy student, I'd point out that perhaps the only thing that is certain is that there exists, somewhere, some infinite entity. Whether that entity is the universe, God, or something entirely else, it is perhaps impossible to conceive of a physical space with defined boundaries that does not exist within some greater physical/spiritual/whatever space. Eventually you have to get to some entity outside of which nothing exists, which therefore lacks any definable boundaries and is therefore, literally, infinite. Once you accept that something infinite exists, than absolute certainty becomes literally impossible since you must always concede that your certainty is based solely on your own finite experience or on the experience of some defined, finite, culture. Thus, the whole of human experience can teach us, literally, only an infinitessimal portion of truth and morality.