Tuesday, August 26, 2008

Defending Originalism (Long)

Daniel Koffler, a blogger at The Art of the Possible approvingly links to a Richard Posner article at The New Republic critical of decision in the landmark Second Amendment case District of Columbia v Heller. As Koffler has also criticized originalism (also here), this presents a good opportunity to provide rebuttal to both of their positions. Please note that when I use the term "originalism", I will refer to "original meaning originalism" (interpreting the text based on the meanings as understood at the time of ratification). Any other "originalism", like "original intent" originalism, will be referred to by name.

I will not comment on Posner's article, as Ed Whelan cover much of the same ground I would (save for one major disagreement at the every end of the second point he makes...). I had anticipated to comment, but as I read Koffler's criticisms of originalism, I found that some of the criticisms I had reserved for Posner would apply here as well. In addition, as Koffler attempted a lengthy criticism on originalism, I thought it would present an opportunity to rebut his arguments.

Koffler, by using a construct of "Scalia Original Meaning", suggests that Scalia makes it up as he goes and engages in pseudo-sophistication under the guise of originalism while employing the same methods of interpretation used by living constitutionalists. Furthermore, things get a little more complicated because while some of the criticisms of Scalia or judges in general being ideologically biased have merit (Randy Barnett has argued that Scalia is not an originalist at all), it does not necessarily follow that Heller can not be justified on originalist grounds. Part of what I will need to do is, as best I can, separate the claims that can be made against Scalia's jurisprudence and focus only on originalism qua originalism.

Koffler's critique of originalism is very long and covers a lot of ground, but I will attempt to focus on three main criticisms: i) interpreting the Constitution according to its original meaning requires, in practice, the same leaps of faith employed by non-originalists to interpret text and meaning; ii) even if the original meaning of the Second Amendment were known, the right to own a handgun for self defense cannot be reconciled to the text; and iii) (2 parts) originalism is doomed to failure if we recognize that the text of the Ninth Amendment protects unenumerated rights and that Heller is radically damaging to libertarian readings of the Constitution.



I
Koffler attempts to decipher Scalia's interpretive method and argues that what Scalia is really doing is getting whatever meaning he wants out of the text. I disagree. The relevant portion of Scalia's opinion that comes under scrutiny is the following:

In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’ United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 731 (1931); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188 (1824). Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.

From this, Koffler proposes a three-pronged approach to Scalia's interpretive method:

First, cast backwards to the temporal setting in which the expression was introduced into the law...but go no further than back than that. Second, determine the context of usage based on what, in present-day language, appears by a principle of parsimony to be the most salient context without consideration of any historical factors that might have shifted the saliences of alternate contexts. Third, ...keep up the exclusion of all historical or other information extraneous to the selected context and determine the ordinary and/or normal meaning at the time of the adoption of the expression into law in the context selected as salient by present-day semantic considerations, by evaluating all usage in the context selected in the second step and deleting all technical or otherwise specialized usages...

In my opinion, the only part of Koffler's three-part analysis that squarely reconciles to the Scalia quote above is Part 1 because Part 1 is the only part that deals with constitutional interpretation (i.e. determining the linguistic meaning of the text). What Part 2 and Part 3 represent, collectively, is constitutional construction, or the application of vague or indeterminate text in order to create legal rules pursuant to the meaning of that document, and nothing in Scalia's quote addresses construction. The distinction between interpretation and construction is crucial and is a key component of originalism. Randy Barnett, a noted originalist and author of Restoring the Lost Constituiton, in a recent post at The Volokh Conspiracy, writes (my emphasis added):

In my view, where the (original) meaning of the Constitution is vague, we should select constructions that are consistent with that meaning and that enhance whatever it is that makes a constitution legitimate. Because people operate with different implicit conceptions of legitimacy (e.g. consent, justice, democracy, etc.) there is marked disagreement about how to do construction. Of utmost importance is that, depending on their theory of legitimacy, originalists who are committed to respecting the original public meaning of the Constitution can still differ on how they think construction should be done and, even if they agree about this, they may differ in the wisdom of different constructions. But when these disagreements arise, it is very useful to know what it is we are disagreeing about: not the meaning of the Constitution, but how to put that meaning into effect.

Koffler, in describing Step 2, is not describing interpretation. Rather, he is describing constitutional construction, and he is doing so in a way that is wholly incompatible with constitutional construction in an orignalism framework.

Step 2 has no business whatsoever being included in a procedure for determining the original meaning of an expression. By applying contemporary considerations of the relative saliences of candidate contexts and having selected one and excluding all others from further work in the application of the semantic theory, one is applying a filter to the expression under consideration that cuts its ties to its original context. The derived context step 2 establishes is in fact roughly the way we would project an expression from an earlier period into the present and then try to make an inductive guess about its meaning — in other words, if we see the law as a body of doctrines that evolve along with language and with history, such that what is important about a legal expression is what it most plausibly means under contemporary lights, then step 2 is the way to go.

I am in complete agreement with his first sentence, but the rest of the paragraph is troublesome. Here, I believe he is not only confusing interpretation with construction, but also suggesting that going outside the text at all in any circumstances amounts to living constitutionalism. Yes, an originalist would apply the relevant facts and circumstances to a given case or controversy if text is vague and/or indeterminate. Yes, there is no one agreed-upon method that this sort of evaluation could be carried out which, admittedly, may lead to a possibility of conflicting conclusions (although I do not believe this to be the case for Heller). However, 1) original "context" is not important because it is "original meaning" is (to me, others may disagree) legitimate and therefore binding; 2) we are not "projecting an expression" in order to "make an inductive guess" about its meaning. We can ascertain the meaning of "commerce" or "necessary and proper" or "the right to bear arms". What we are doing is creating a rule of construction that respects the meaning or the underlying text and enhances legitimacy; and 3) although constitutional rules may be applied to situations that the Framers themselves never anticipated, it does not follow that originalists agree that the meaning of the text has somehow changed.



II
Koffler argues that, even if we did draw out the original meaning of the Second Amendment (although this has been determined), it would not apply to handguns:

If Scalia were indeed drawing out the original meanings of Constitutional provisions, incidentally, then he would conclude that the “arms” to which the 2nd Amendment refers would include in its domain things like muskets, old-timey artillery, sabers, etc., and definitely not Glocks. If the interpretation were loosened of literal constraints, it would open up to include military grade weapons along with handguns. The clear context in which the right to bear arms is embedded in the Constitution is as a check on tyranny — i.e., so that citizens could arm themselves and overthrow the government — and as armaments in a militia. In each case, the context ensures that military-grade weapons will be among those to which citizens have a right. If the scope of “arms” is broadened to include contemporary arms and not just the weapons of the colonial period, then the true spirit of Scalian originalism would find a Constitutional right to own AK-47s, rockets, tanks, F-14s, etc. Scalia of course rejects such an interpretation.

Nowhere in Koffler's construction of the word "arms" does he mention "weapons" or "pistols", either of which could have easily been constructed from the word "arms" and would certainly apply to Glocks. To do so would not be living constitutionalism, it would be a simple construction that not only ties to the original meaning of the word arms but also is a "legitimacy-enhancing" feature because of the construction, by permitting handgun ownership for self defense, does not infringe upon one's own natural right to self defense, a common law right predating the Constitution. The "literal constraints" are nothing more than vaguaries and limitations of a text that was written 200 years ago.

Suggesting that originalism would suggest that we have to allow a constitutional right to own a F-14, tanks, rockets, etc. implies a belief that rights are absolute and beyond the reach of the legislators, ignoring "appropriate" state police powers that regulate rightful conduct and prohibit wrongful conduct. Given the public health/safety concerns and the negative externalities associated with high explosives, bans on possessing those types of weapons are not unreasonable. There are probably a couple more reasons as well, but this brief explanation ought to suffice. I think originalist constitutional construction could lead us to these conclusions as well although I will not provide an example.



III
I am thrilled to see Koffler spend as much time as he does discussing the Ninth Amendment. I am pleased that he recognizes the importance of unenumerated rights as individual rights (some Ninth Amendment scholarship focuses on collective or majoritarian rights) and that arguments that rights do not exist on the basis that they are unenumerated is a non-starter (he uses privacy as his example). Such commentary is welcome and would make a great many libertarians pleased, even moreso if the discussion entailed the Privileges of Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment.

That said, he seems to disparage originalism (no pun intended) on Ninth Amendment grounds:

So-called originalists loathe the concept because it creates a platform for reading elements into the Constitution that could have had no place in its original composition (like the “umbral” right, if you will, to use birth control, which follows from the penumbral right to privacy). But the problem for the originalist position — and the reason, I argue, it is ultimately untenable — is that the 9th Amendment is in the Constitution, and can’t just be read out of it without vitiating originalism.

Understandably, if one were to take Robert Bork's "inkblot" comment and associate it with originalism (his was in the context, if I recall, of original intent originalism), then it could lead someone to suggest what he says to be the case. However, originalism, especially understood by classical liberals and libertarians, makes the best case for protecting unenumerated rights both under the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment. Randy Barnett goes into great length to argue this case in Restoring the Lost Constitution. If one does not have the text on hand, there are journal articles available at SSRN that addresss both of these parts of the Constituiton (9th here and 14th here).

If he is serious about the Ninth Amendment (and therefore serious about the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment), then he should reconsider his argument that Heller is "radically damaging" to libertarian readings of the Constituiton and apply that argument to Griswold v Connecticut, which, in my view, is a legal abomination. Heller is a Second Amendment case where the majority protected an individual liberty against an overly intrusive government. That is very libertarian and refreshing to see someone finally recognize that the Second Amendment really does mean what it says it means. The Ninth Amendment was virtually read out of the Constitution decades ago (and was not the basis for the majority opinion in Griswold) so there is nothing Heller could have done that had already been done.

Why Griswold? Prior to 1937, the Court, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, did protect unenumerated rights, mainly economic liberties under what was known as "freedom of contract". Basically, the Court viewed that the terms in which contracts were to be established was a private matter. Therefore, maximum hours laws, minimum wage laws, laws preventing yellow dog contracts, etc. were struck down by the Supreme Court. Admittedly, these were (are) controversial cases (i.e. Lochner v New York) that draw ire from today's liberals and conservatives. There were also two key privacy-related cases involving education that were decided under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment (Meyer v Nebraska and Pierce v Society of Sisters).

This changed dramatically in 1937 when the Supreme Court virtually repudiated this jurisprudence in West Coast Hotel v Parrish (upholding a minimum wage law) and further signifying the death knell in U.S. v Carolene Products in 1938 where, in a footnote (Footnote Four), the two-tiered system of rights we have today was basically established. In short, in practice, any potential violation of an enumerated right gets heightened scrutiny and unenumerated rights are left to the whims of democratic majorities. This is, obviously, very unlibertarian, but more importantly, it ignores significant portions of the text (like the Ninth Amendment).

Justice Douglas' Griswold opinion does two things: 1) it specifically repudiates the pre-1937 Due Process jurisprudence that can protect those rights not enumerated in the Constitution by employing a presumption of liberty and putting the burden on government to justify its action (under modern jurisprudence, the burden rests on the individual). Meyer v Nebraska would be a great precedent for Griswold; and 2) his "penumbras" are an attempt to suggest privacy as an enumerated right by suggesting that privacy has substantive protections in several of the enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion mentions the Ninth Amendment (and recognizes the protection of unenumerated rights) but the majority opinion does not. The fact that those "penumbras" may exist in the Ninth Amendment, as Koffler suggests, plays no role here because the majority opinion does not cite it.

Both Koffler and I agree with the substantive outcomes of both Heller and Griswold but take opposite positions on whether or not each case was well-reasoned. Yet, despite our disagreements, I am pleased by Koffler's attention to the Ninth Amendment and the protection of unenumerated liberties. That said, I am uncertain as to how far Koffler would be willing to take his argument. He speaks of being "plausible" under the Ninth Amendment without defining what "plausible" is (would he, for example, argue the federal minimum wage law unconstitutional under freedom of contract? Would he repudiate West Coast Hotel v Parrish?). Furthermore, how does view on the Ninth Amendment reconcile with the rest of the text (specifically Article I, Section VIII and the Tenth Amendment)?

I make these points largely in part because I do not know or presume to know Koffler's positions on these matters, but it also flows from my general skepticism towards advocates of "privacy rights" (mainly on the Left), who hold a very limited (if not perverse) view of what privacy really is. If he's interested, he is more than welcome to share them.

Monday, August 25, 2008

All Factions Serve Only the Faction's Purpose

Rather than point to George Will's column from yesterday criticizing Sen. Obama's economic rhetoric and writing "what he wrote", instead, a serious quibble. Will writes:

But back to requiring this or that quota of energy from renewable sources. What will that involve? For conservatives, seeing is believing; for liberals, believing is seeing. Obama seems to believe that if a particular outcome is desirable, one can see how to require it. But how does that work? Details to follow, sometime after noon Jan. 20, 2009.

I think I'm supposed to take a less unfavorable opinion of conservatives from this statement. I don't because it need only be reworked to be an equally devastating dismissal of conservative politicians. Like this:

... Conservative politicians seem to believe that if a particular outcome can be required, one can see how to achieve it. But how does that work? Details to follow, sometime after noon Jan. 20, 2009.

I could slip McCain's name into that for a specific example. Maybe let's put Bush in there. Whoever, about whatever. Let's include Joe Biden, now that he's politician most recently thrust into the national equation after being named the Democratic nominee for VP. Or circle back and discuss Obama. It does not matter.

The proper diagnosis is the flaw in politicians. We should probably reason our way to what is fundamental. That flaw is more pronounced in those who believe politicians and permit themselves to be pandered to by our great anti-statesmen. Having resolve is enough. A topic is just something to be tacked on to, and achieved through, resolve. That mindset thinks society demonstrates its resolve through what it requires. The sickness is the same, regardless of the symptom.

I doubt Sen. Obama believes any of his rhetoric about what is achievable for energy goals in the timeframes George Will critiques. I don't doubt that Obama doesn't care. The power to control and push is more important than the destination. It is the destination of the rhetoric.

Conservatives (and liberals) love declaring war on drugs. They believe that if they require compliance to abstinence, then poof, the problem disappears. Results do not matter. Years of prohibition of drugs and alcohol aren't lessons that the approach is ignorant, only that we haven't tried the correct requirement yet. Results related to the claimed objective never matter to politicians, regardless of the topic. Power is the purpose for all politicians.

When dealing with politicians, liberal and conservative are just adjectives the wise use to identify which brand of stupid is loose.

Post Script: The sentiment in this entry's title is probably obvious to anyone reading. I couldn't think of anything better (i.e. less literal). But since someone like George Will seems to have forgotten the point, maybe that's not so bad.

Wednesday, August 20, 2008

Don't Tread on Me

Via A Stitch in Haste

James Hetfield, the lead singer of Metallica determined that there was a problem with vandals on his private property and decides to erect a fence to keep people off of it. Sounds pretty straightforward to me (although not necessarily to MSNBC given the obvious tilt of the headline).

Of course, when the definition of "public use" involves the use of one's land by non-owners of that land, and the "public" thinks that they should have access to that land, things start to get a bit messy and needless controversy arises. I agree with Kip on all points, and for any defender of property rights, this is a no-brainer:

- The property is owned by James Hetfield. It is his and his alone to do with as he wishes so long as it doesn't violate the rights of others.

- It is his right, exclusively, to enter into an agreement that allows people access to his property on terms that he finds acceptable.

- If a municipality is unable to reach an agreement with Hetfield (or any other landowner) on terms regarding an easement (although libertarians would argue this is not a legitimate function of government), private individuals or associations of individuals can reach out to Hetfield and attempt to negotiate an easement at terms Hetfield would accept.

- If these measures fail, then access to the land is not granted.

This isn't the first time Hetfield has been in a situation where his stance towards protecting his own property has drawn criticism. I recall many upset Metallica fans circa 2000 when the band sued Napster.

Situations like this one remind me that the distinction between what is public and what is private is virtually non-existent. Worse, if we follow the tortured logic of the Supreme Court's abominable ruling in Kelo v New London, all a hack bureaucrat needs to do is argue "public use" as "public purpose" and argue a public benefit of keeping the hiking trail open to attempt to take the land via eminent domain. I am not arguing such an event would occur or it would be successful in the event that it would occur. However, the fact Kip or I would even think about eminent domain in this situation speaks volumes about the utter disregard many people have for private property rights.

Inspiration for the post title here.

So bad that a Malkin Award may not be sufficient?

I think so...

Via Andrew Sullivan:

"Regardless of law, marriage has only one definition, and any government that attempts to change it is my mortal enemy. I will act to destroy that government and bring it down, so it can be replaced with a government that will respect and support marriage, and help me raise my children in a society where they will expect to marry in their turn. Biological imperatives trump laws. American government cannot fight against marriage and hope to endure. If the Constitution is defined in such a way as to destroy the privileged position of marriage, it is that insane Constitution, not marriage, that will die." - Orson Scott Card

I find it so comforting that we have people among us who show so much respect for a government that would respect the rights of others by simply leaving them alone that they would want to destroy that government and replace it with the sort of society where he can impose his will on others. Using the word "insane" to describe a Constitution that would protect such rights only reinforces why Madison was concerned about factions. That "insane" Constitution keeps people like Card from using "democratic process" (i.e. unbridled majoritarianism) from violating the rights of others. I'm quite thankful for that, although there is much work to be done.

As a side note, his attempt to elevate marriage over property rights, which he does in his editorial (which I will not link from this blog) is absurd (along with the rest of the piece). Others can have fun using it as a punching bag. At this rate, I may as well be taking lessons on civil liberties from Michelle Malkin.

I don't know if the Malkin Award is appropriate here*. Maybe Andrew should create an Orwell Award for tripe of this sort. If anyone has a better idea, I'm all ears.

Putting lipstick on a pig?

Discussing libertarian paternalism, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, in an opinion piece in the Financial Times, write:


In this light, it is not surprising that policy teams for Barack Obama, the US Democratic presidential candidate, and David Cameron, the Conservative party leader, have shown an interest in nudge-like solutions to social problems. In dealing with the credit crisis in the US, Mr Obama favours a policy of disclosure and transparency. His mortgage policy is designed not to preclude choices, but to ensure that consumers have a better sense of what they are getting. In dealing with environmental problems and crime, Mr Cameron seeks to enlist the power of social norms, pricking people's consciences to inspire them to do better. Ideas of this kind suggest the development of an approach we call "libertarian paternalism", by which governments try to move people in good directions without imposing penalties, mandates or bans.

"Libertarian paternalism" has nothing to do with libertarianism and everything to do with paternalism. Speaking of "friendly nudges" where mandates, penalties or bans are not imposed, I think a mortgage policy makes a great example as to why this notion is absurd. Let us assume a policy that, as the authors put it, ensure that the consumers knows what he or she is getting into. Like any regulatory scheme, such a program would require (mandate) lenders disclose certain information to borrowers, require lenders maintain compliance with this and will directly penalize violators via fines. I do not see how it would work any other way. How else is the law enforced? What is also going in is that 1) the policy would impose a cost to lenders in terms of increased compliance costs, and 2) the policy would imposes additional costs to taxpayers with respect to the cost to enforce the new policy. How is forcing everyone, through law, to come along for the ride libertarian? Sunstein and Thaler may want to read Frederic Bastiat.

Furthermore, the so-called libertarian paternalists claim that they aim for policy goals that seek to promote the general welfare without eliminating the freedom of choice. They may claim, as Sunstein and Thaler do, that Obama's mortgage policy is designed not to preclude choices to consumers but it would very likely, as I speculated above, force lenders into regulatory structures that they themselves would rather avoid when given a choice. Shouldn't individuals who are pursuing their own entreprenurial interests in a way that violates the right of no one be allowed to do so as he or she sees fit? Wouldn't the market-friendly solution to a lender that refuses to disclose some of the information a consumer wishes to achieve is for the consumer to do business with a lender who does?

Unless there is something I am missing (I have not read Sunstein and Thaler's paper), libertarian paternalsim seems nothing more than a dressed-up form of liberalism that attempts to address the issues important to libertarians. In other words, they've put lipstick on a pig.

Saturday, August 16, 2008

I'm sure I'm on the No Fly List now.

The original version of this entry is posted at Rolling Doughnut. I think it's relevant here, too. I've trimmed out the meta references.

----------

I flew to Buffalo this morning. Everything was fine until I reached the security checkpoint at Dulles. A TSA employee approached me with a strange device strapped to his arm. Allow me to roughly quote our conversation:

TSA: We're testing a new device that scans for liquid explosives. Do you mind if I scan your bag? It will only take about 20 seconds.

Me: Do I have a choice? Can I say no?

TSA: Yes.

Me: Then I'm saying no.

First things first. I worded my question with the same careful consideration TSA - all law enforcement, really - used to craft theirs. If they could search my bag just because, they would've demanded rather than asked. I've watched enough episodes of Cops to be wise to the game. Anyway, I already knew the answer to my question. But initially playing dumb makes sense because authority has a tendency to get mean after realizing it's been out-smarted. Also, it's more fun.

After I said "no", the TSA employee walked away. I watched as he returned to the security desk rather than moving on to people behind me and began a conversation I could not hear. I knew what it was, though, because our national security-at-all-costs mindset is so predictable. I also saw what happened in front of me. I reached the front of the line and handed my boarding pass and ID to the next TSA employee. He eyed me a moment too long, then looked at my ID. He carried this on for several cycles, apparently trying to stare me into submission. Another TSA employee had also stepped in front of the line and held everything up. Crisis management with manufactured crisis.

The TSA employee with my boarding pass and ID handed them back. I stepped forward and another TSA employee, flanked by two more employees, motioned me aside from the other passengers and away from the metal detectors. The two extraneous individuals stood behind her, one looking over each shoulder. Our conversation:

TSA 1: Sir, is there a reason you refused the scan of your bags when we asked?

Me: Yes. I asked if I had a choice. He said yes. So I said no. I don't see how that gives you a reason to pull me aside now.

TSA 2: You do understand why we do this?

Me: I have rights. I'm exercising them. Are we done?

TSA 1: Yes.

I proceeded through security with no more trouble, which was a nice surprise. Still, the TSA's policy approach to security is clear. Submit. Don't question. Stand up for your rights, or even mere logic, and we will make your life hell, even if it's only in this inconvenience. You don't want another 9/11, do you? But who feels better knowing that the full attention of at least seven TSA employees focused on one man exercising his rights? That's nothing more than security theater.

Update: I just opened my checked bag. Everything had been searched thoroughly and haphazardly, or perhaps maliciously. My toiletries bag was unzipped, a pocket in my suitcase was unzipped, and the car charger case was unzipped. All three were zipped when I finished packing my suitcase this morning. And my clothes were stuffed back in.

Thursday, August 14, 2008

Of Searches and Seizures

Via Instapundit and, oddly enough, TalkLeft comes this story about the increasingly common use of GPS devices to track criminal suspects without a warrant. According to the story, police are in some (unknown and super secret) way attaching GPS devices to vehicles of persons suspected of crimes. Courts have regularly upheld the use of these devices even when no warrant is obtained for their use under the theory that one's actions while driving on a public street are not entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy.

According to the article, and verified by the arguments made at TalkLeft, it would seem that the primary argument being made by privacy advocates and civil libertarians is that the use of GPS systems and the storage of data collected therefrom is far in excess of any information that could be collected simply by having a police officer tail the suspect. Civil libertarians note that GPS devices permit tracking even when the vehicle is entirely on private property where there is no dispute that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.

Unfortunately, I think the civil libertarians are barking up the wrong tree on this one. To be sure, the concept of the creeping surveillance state is more than a little worrisome and is generally quite un-libertarian, but constitutionally (or at least under now longstanding constitutional precedent) I think the State is on relatively firm ground insofar as it argues that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on public streets.

But that doesn't mean that this is the only argument against the use of these devices. As Glenn Reynolds notes, the act of placing the tracking device on the vehicle constitutes the tort of trespass to chattels, for which a private citizen would be liable to another private citizen. Unfortunately, simply permitting law enforcement to do things that would be illegal in any other context and holding them to a lower standard of behavior is pretty much par for the course these days.

Still, I think there is an argument to be made that the use of these GPS devices without a warrant constitutes a 4th Amendment violation - just not of the sort suggested by the folks at TalkLeft. The 4th Amendment does not just include a prohibition on warrantless unreasonable searches (generally interpreted to include invasions of privacy in certain circumstances), but also on unreasonable "seizures." Naturally, when we think of a "seizure," the first thing that comes to mind is a situation where the government quite literally uses the force of law to deprive a property owner of ownership. But that's not the full definition of a "seizure," which is as far as I can tell consistently defined as "the taking possession of person or property by legal process." And what, pray tell, is the legal meaning of the word "possession"? "The having, holding, or detention of property in one's power or command; actual seizin or occupancy; ownership, whether rightful or wrongful." In almost any respect, the intentional attaching of an item to another's property without that individual's permission is an act of ownership. Moreover, if the placement of the GPS devices is, in fact, a trespass to chattels (unfortunately not a tort I have much experience with), then it's worth noting that the tort of trespass to chattels is defined to require the "dispossession" of a chattel (aka, physical property other than real estate).

So, assuming this would be a trespass to chattels, the question becomes "Can the government 'dispossess' an individual of that individual's property without a warrant while still complying with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures?"

I'll cop to having done barely any research on this issue, which is outside the strongest areas of my legal knowledge, so if my theory on this turns out to be more or less cockamamie or has been rejected by the SCOTUS already, please let me know.

Wednesday, August 13, 2008

College: A Liberaltarian Take

(via Memeorandum)

If you ask me, I will deny to my grave that I am a "left-libertarian." But that doesn't mean that I think modern liberalism and libertarianism are fully incompatible as prospective coalition partners, as I've pointed out far too many times.

In any event, Charles Murray (of The Bell Curve fame) has a piece today that argues that, "For Most People, College Is A Waste of Time." Murray opens his column thusly:

Imagine that America had no system of post-secondary education, and you were a member of a task force assigned to create one from scratch. One of your colleagues submits this proposal:

"First, we will set up a single goal to represent educational success, which will take four years to achieve no matter what is being taught. We will attach an economic reward to it that seldom has anything to do with what has been learned. We will urge large numbers of people who do not possess adequate ability to try to achieve the goal, wait until they have spent a lot of time and money, and then deny it to them. We will stigmatize everyone who doesn't meet the goal. We will call the goal a "BA.""

You would conclude that your colleague was cruel, not to say insane. But that's the system we have in place."


This gets at a point that I've long tried to make - our current assumption that college is a necessity is an assumption that not only ignores the irrelevance of college to most careers, but also generates enormous entry barriers to those careers for low-income people. Unfortunately, Murray then proposes a solution that is as bad or worse than the problem: certification exams in just about every field, aka, licensing. (Rather than reading me explain all that is wrong with this proposal, just pretend like the standard libertarian diatribe against licensing has been inserted here). But ignoring for the moment Murray's problematic solution, the basic point about the value of a college education (or lack thereof) is one that ought to accord beautifully with standard liberal critiques of capitalism and corporate America, as I point out below.

Unfortunately, in response to Murray's article, one of the folks at the Lefty blog Pandagon goes on a rant about how Murray's diagnosis and solution just reinforce the notion that he is a racist whose sole aim is to privatize education in order to prevent minorities from receiving government grants and loans for the education. Alas, in obsessing over attacking the caricature of Murray, the Pandagon blogger misses how the first part of Murray's argument, pertaining to the lack of value in a college education, accords shockingly well with modern liberal criticisms of corporate America, racism, and classism. As a result, I wrote:

"Murray gets the diagnosis right, but his proposal is far from an improvement. I'm not going to rehash all the problems with his proposal which have been made above, which amount to pointing out the inherent bias in any certification/licensing scheme (something which most libertarians find far worse than employer emphases on BA's).

But on the issue of the value of college, I think he is right in principle, though perhaps wrong in application. The problem is that for the vast majority of people college does little to enhance their career prospects and, for that matter, does little to teach them "how to think." Obviously, people who major or minor in the liberal arts (including the "hard" sciences) learn plenty about how to think critically, but four years of learning how to do so is overkill for most people (hence the reason most people don't
major in the liberal arts). Moreover, as I said, most people do not major or minor in the liberal arts but instead major in more "practical" things - majors that largely didn't exist until relatively recently. This is not good - at best people in these majors learn a percentage of what they would learn by gaining four years of experience in their preferred field. To the extent they do learn some of what they otherwise would have, they are paying a huge amount for it. And guess what? Their future employer gets to reap the benefits without having to pay a red cent, since there is virtually no
premium paid for the college-educated employee in these fields. Indeed, the employer actually gets to save the salary they would have paid the prospective employee to provide the employee with training - in this way, college in these fields amounts to employee-subsidized training. There's probably no better way to demonstrate this fact than to point out that [according to liberal critics] real wages have effectively stagnated during a period where the percentage of people with college degrees has exploded. Frankly, this makes sense as well - as an employer, would you really be willing to pay more money to someone fresh out of college, with no "real world" track record, than you would to someone with four to six years experience who is demonstrably reliable? Probably not.

Put another way - the current assumption that everyone should have a college degree is an assumption that (1) almost entirely benefits employers, who receive any benefits of the employee's education free of charge, and (2) places extreme financial burdens on future employees in pursuit of obtaining unnecessary qualifications. To be sure, there are still some professions where a liberal arts degree provides a significant benefit (law and research science, for example), and certainly a liberal arts education can be marginally useful in creating a more critical citizenry. But for the vast majority of people, the assumption that they need to incur tens of thousands of dollars in debt while forgoing any meaningful income for four to six years is an assumption that provides little benefit in exchange for tremendous cost.



As I indicated at the top of this post, a critique of our social emphasis on higher education is a critique that can closely agree with many standard liberal critiques of capitalism. To the extent that Progressives/modern liberals seek to defend the assumption that higher education is inherently a desirable thing, the effect of doing so is to defend a state in which employers (aka, "corporate America") receive benefits at no cost to them, but at great cost to the employee. Of course, many Progressives would respond by arguing that costs of higher education should be borne by expanding grant programs and the like. But all that does is shift the costs from the individual student to taxpayers as a whole - "corporate America" still gets its subsidy.

Tuesday, August 12, 2008

The Good Stuff

I've done a "linkfest" style post approximately, well, never. But a combination of an extremely busy few weeks at my paying job and some really, really good posts has left me with no choice but to finally throw out some quick hit links (not that there's anything wrong with that).

So...

John Schwenkler notes the bizarre lack of self-awareness in The National Review's terming Russia's treatment of Georgia as a "war crime in itself."

As noted in my post downblog, the Newshoggers have been on the ball in trying to sort through all the propaganda (on all sides) in the Georgia-Russia battle. BJ Bjornson's post on the claimed end of combat operations is just the latest example, and at least indirectly destroys the notion that Russia is the new Nazi Germany (or, if you will, the new Russia, err, Soviet Union).

Sticking with the (inadvertent) Georgia theme, our friend Kip points out the giant elephant in the room exposed by the longstanding problems in South Ossetia (and, by implication, Abkhazia): the failure of the nation-state model. Kip hits on a particularly critical issue that I've been pondering for a long, long time: "I have no idea what model can, should or will replace Westphalian sovereignty in the mosaic regions of the world. But I do know, as a libertarian and as a member of an insular political minority myself, that whatever "new world order" emerges, it will have to be based, not on ethnicities, religions or languages, nor on rivers, mountains or latitudes. It must be based on legitimacy, built from within and not imposed from without. "

Switching topics (finally) but staying with Kip, we have further proof of John Yoo's complete lack of legal acumen. That this man is now teaching future laws sends shivers down my spine.

Via Jim Henley at Unqualified Offerings, Radley Balko asks readers which American wars were justified (in retrospect). For the most part, I'm with Jim; I tend to think the Revolution was justified, but only to the extent it was a grassroots rebellion against illegitimate authority . I think the Civil War was legitimate, but only because the basis for secession (protection of slavery, emphasis on states' rights over individual rights) was illegitimate - had the South had a legitimate fear of interference with individual rights, secession would have been justified and the ensuing war would not have been. I think the first Gulf War was justified as a matter of international law, and I also think that Bush I appropriately limited the war to liberating Kuwait's sovereignty rather than pursuing a full-scale invasion of Iraq. It's hard not to justify Afghanistan, even if I have serious concerns with the manner in which we have been involved.

What Matters Most...

I've long abandoned any pretense of supporting Obama. But that doesn't mean I still don't think he's a less-bad choice than McCain. As much as Obama has increasingly come to parrot the foreign policy establishment consensus that has held sway in Washington for, well, a really long time, Obama's consensus view is far less dangerous than the reflexive aggression characterized by the last eight years and, yes, Senator McCain. It is the rejection of this reflexive aggression, which adds trillions to the national debt, destroys American credibility and moral standing, and directly destroys untold thousands of lives both at home and abroad, that I view as the single most important issue this fall.

The events of the last week or so related to the conflict in Georgia/South Ossetia, and the responses of the candidates do a good job demonstrating this. To be sure, McCain is now receiving plaudits for immediately blaming Russia when hostilities began in earnest last Friday in a way that not even President Bush was willing to do. But Hilzoy points out why, exactly, those plaudits are entirely undeserved - the bottom line is that at the time McCain's statement was issued, the known facts made clear that both Russia and Georgia were at fault in their own way. Although the facts on the ground have changed and Russia is now clearly going far beyond any sense of a proportional response, this does not change the fact that McCain's statement was simply wrong at the time it was made to the extent that it laid all blame for the situation on Russia.

McCain's response reflects a simplistic world view in which those nations deemed inherently enemies of the US are reflexively blamed in toto for any conflicts, wars, or disagreements. Those deemed allies are reflexively held to be innocent - and not only innocent, but also bastions of liberal virtue and democracy.

Unfortunately, in the case of Georgia, the narrative of the bastion of democracy is far from the truth. This is not to praise the Russians or Putin or Medvedev - only to point out that neither set of players is particularly sympathetic or worth defending on a political level. Yet the knee-jerk reactions of "National Greatness" conservatives again pretends to defend liberal virtue and democracy by defending one group of authoritarians against another simply because the friendly authoritarians like the other authoritarians even less than we do.

And so we get the "National Greatness" crowd (which usually includes McCain) rattling sabers all over again, demanding that we "do something" to aid the Georgians in their fight against the Russians. And let us not forget the longstanding insistence of McCain and others that Georgia be admitted to NATO, no matter whether that would have obligated us to come completely and totally to Georgia's defense this week, as required in any alliance...it chills me to think what we would have done in such a situation at a time when the US military is already fighting in two armed conflicts.*

The fact is that the simplistic view of good and evil advocated by so many on the political Right results in a situation where all foreign policy follows the dictum "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." While unintended consequences are inevitable in almost anything government does, a foreign policy based on this dictum is a recipe and guarantor for the worst kinds of unintended consequences. It results in needless provocation of enemies or potential enemies; it further destroys American moral standing by propping up autocracies that are barely distinguishable from the enemy autocracies over which we claim moral superiority; it entangles us in foreign adventures that only minimally implicate American interests, if at all; and it ensures the ever-upward increase in military spending (and thus the national debt).


More at memeorandum.

Also - a quick plug for the crew at Newshoggers, who have done an outstanding job trying to piece together the reality of the Russia-Georgia conflict. They may be slightly too anti-Georgian, but their takes are easily the most nuanced and intellectually honest that I've seen.


*This is not to say I'm against all alliances, or even NATO itself - quite the contrary, for reasons that I may try to explain in a future post. But it is difficult to imagine a worse candidate for inclusion in that alliance than Georgia.

Thursday, August 7, 2008

Should a libertarian vote for a populist?

I had a discussion recently with a friend in which we discussed the possibility of voting for Sen. Obama in the fall. I've been mulling over what he said, which boils down to this: the issue of judicial appointees is important enough that it may be worthwhile to vote against Sen. McCain for Sen. Obama in a state that is in play. If you're in California, for example, there's no reason to bother. Obama will win those electoral votes. Somewhere else, maybe a libertarian could justify the awful bargain.

Somewhere else likely includes Virginia. Over the last few weeks, I've been evaluating my "no way, under no circumstances" position on voting for Obama. Virginia is most definitely in play. Our local and state politics have traditionally been much more Democrat-oriented than our national politics, which is heavily Republican at the Senate and presidential level. (The House is a bit mixed, varying by region.) The local tendency is bleeding into our national tendency because of the large Democratic growth in Northern Virginia.

Then I read stories about Obama's economic pandering, as conveyed in this column by Ruth Marcus on Obama's populism. Among the many examples of egregiousness:

Yes, but what does Obama himself believe? "I think oil companies are amoral. They want to make as much money as they can for their shareholders, which is what corporations do," he says. "The difference is the nature of the kind of outsized profits they make that may have no relationship to their investments or their production. The fact, for example, [that] the shortage of refinery capacity could actually increase their profits so the less they invest the more they make indicates that you are not dealing with someone making widgets out there."

"Outsized profits." Nice, not-so-subtle adjective to describe an amoral, objective goal.

"No relationship to their investments or their production." So, Obama is a trained financial analyst who's spent years learning the oil business? And he's running for Financial Analyst of the United States?

"The less they invest the more they make." Doesn't this suggest that the optimal investment strategy is zero investment? Is that the strategy oil companies pursue?

"Not dealing with someone making widgets." Obama trusts the market. Except this one. It's different. (They always are.) The laws of economics somehow don't apply to it, so he must regulate it. He doesn't want to, but he must. For the people.

I think my friend's strategy is correct. Lose the battle to win the war. But this is a new data point. I see nothing here to convince me that I can vote for Sen. Obama. If his economics are so obviously terrible, why should anyone trust him to not be obviously terrible on judicial nominees, pandering to the politics of the moment rather than a long-standing principle? When we get closer to November, maybe I'll reconsider. Now? No. It's Bob Barr or a vote for myself.

All of this culminates in a continued disbelief that Sen. Obama can be considered good for libertarians. Either he sticks with his populist rhetoric and violates economic rights for four-to-eight years (or more) or he pushes for the policies many libertarians dream that he believes in. Even if the latter occurs, he merely proves that he's a lying politician. I'll stay cynical.

Tuesday, August 5, 2008

The Power of One

Radley Balko yesterday broke the news that the State of Mississippi is removing Steven Hayne from its list of approved medical examiners. Balko has been pursuing Hayne for quite some time, most famously in this magnificent Reason piece, and only Balko has any idea of what he has dedicated to bringing down Hayne's profiteering at the expense of the freedom of who-knows-how-many innocents. While others such as the Innocence Project have certainly done their share of yeoman's work leading to this tremendous (but only initial) victory, Balko perhaps deserves a huge amount of credit for putting this perversion of justice in the public eye. Certainly without his work, it is difficult to see how the local media in Mississippi would have fully pursued this story.

As hopeless as political participation may often seem for libertarians, Balko's work proves that there are ways to make the world a little bit more free that don't involve the ballot box.

Monday, August 4, 2008

That may be so. However...

Kip at A Stitch in Haste, pointing out the Left's penchant for moral authoritarianism, writes:


Does [Ezra] Klein have the intellectual horsepower, I wonder, to realize just how much like a certain other group of majoritarians his argument sounds? His reasoning is utterly indistinguishable from that of the most decrepit anti-gay bigots who seek to ban something a tad more substantive than a fast food restaurant. What a delicious sampling of the faux difference between liberals and conservatives: “power to impose our will on others” … versus “power to impose our will on others.”


This is plain as day to libertarians and there is nothing I disagree with here. Both groups, when their sensibilities are outraged, will seek remedies through government intervention if the opportunity exists to do so.

Unfortuneately, to Kip's question, I'm not sure if the Left will ever get the point, and I think it is more a function of indifference towards the similarity rather than not having the intellectual wherewithall to recognize it.

Anecdotally, when I have engaged in these sorts of discussions with liberals and point these things out, the response that I typically get is a defense of their views under fairness, equality and making things better off for people as a whole, a view they do not have about social conservatives. It seems to boil down to a "mine is better/we know what's best" mentally that dismisses the notion that other "inferior" groups could be similar to them, especially that they believe they are working to move society forward and others are trying to move society backward (it would explain the more juvenile attacks towards libertarians that come from the Left).

Not so anecdotally, one can read Paul Krugman's Conscience of a Liberal and observe much of what I wrote above.

Wednesday, July 30, 2008

Burned...

Via Radley Balko:

Of course, you’re still expected to entrust your property to the people who waste resources staging useless, theatrical water shows for the TV cameras. Forget about taking steps to fight an approaching wildfire yourself. You’ll likely be arrested. Want to hire a private firm to provide extra fire protection? That may soon be illegal too, thanks to the Naomi Kleins of the world, who’ve deemed private fire protection “disaster apartheid.”

How the term "disaster apartheid"came from the mouth of the stunningly ignorant Ms. Klein is worth mentioning. Via Reason:

Then the Los Angeles Times and Bloomberg News revealed the shocking news that the American International Group (AIG), an insurance company, had been adding a very modest supplement to the firefighting effort—six trucks—on behalf of its clients. For premiums averaging a hefty $19,000 a year, AIG policyholders in the fire-vulnerable “wildland-urban interface” have their homes assessed for vulnerability, kitted with sprinkler systems, and doused with fire retardant. When wildfires rage within three miles of a covered house, AIG-contracted teams come out to lay down a fresh perimeter of retardant and check the roof and nearby brush for stray embers (the cause of most housing tract losses during an inferno). According to Bloomberg, AIG firefighters saved at least six houses, including one lucky enough to be next door to an AIG client.

In other words, an owner of private property who wants to protect his property from a disaster demands a service that can be provided by someone to provide additional fire protection via a private entity whose interests are far more aligned with the customer then the local public entity. Both sides are incentivized. The homeowner is interested in protecting his or her home and for AIG, the use of a service, assumably, lowers the probability of a payout of a loss claim.

Two parties to a mutually beneficial transaction? Check. No violation of the rights of either party? Check. It sure sounds simple enough to me.

Klein's histrionics do not surprise me. The fact that the possibility of a private service provider donig better than our supposedly dependable and infallible government, be it fire protection services, security services or education, greatly offends the Left, especially those of Naomi Klein's or Rick Pearlstein's ilk.

Nor am I surprised at Pearlstein's complete ignorance toward the concept of privatization. Then again, I do not have faith the egalitarians of Klein's or Pearlstein's sort will ever get their arms around the concept. It's far better to invoke strawmen to whip up the masses.

Reminder for Hayek Fans

Prof. Steven Horwitz will be doing a chat tonight at 7PM at Art of the Possible regarding the ways in which Hayek's vision supports a libertarian worldview more than a conservative one and the ways in which Hayek supported particular roles for the state that other libertarians and conservatives do not. My initial post on this is here.

"A Tale...Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing"

With President Bush's signature today, the mortgage "bailout" has become law. I don't have time to offer my own complete analysis of the bill right now, but our good friend Kip, Esq. has the best and most useful take on it that I've seen so far in terms of describing it more or less layperson's terms. Kip looks at each of the bill's provisions, and finds that - not surprisingly - the bill achieves approximately nothing in the way of solving the alleged mortgage crisis. To the extent it does anything, it actually incentivizes more of the very behavior that created the problems in the first place (i.e., it encourages home-buying from the riskiest borrowers).

Of course, it does raise the debt ceiling ever-higher (inflation is awesome!) and contains its share of non-germane rent-seeking.

Ultimately, I'd say the bill is proof that the ugliest word in the English language is "bi-partisan." If libertarians can't be an important part of the political establishment of either party, the best we can hope for is that Republicans be good where they're supposed to be good (taxes and spending) and Democrats be good where they're supposed to be good (civil liberties and personal freedoms). But when the two of them get together to do something that is overwhelmingly "bi-partisan," especially the last 8 years or so, the result is just about always really, really bad (think PATRIOT Act). The question regarding why things like this pass is a question I don't have time to answer right now.

Tuesday, July 29, 2008

The Politics of Whining

Jackson at AOTP pointed me to this post from "The Great" Tyler Cowen regarding Cowen's theory of political coalitions. Cowen notes the ways in which certain elements of each "side" (most obviously, politicians) changes its arguments tend to result in extremely inconsistent arguments even within the same issue (a critical element of what I would call "pu-pu platter partisanship."). He suggests that this indicates that the two "sides" are less concerned with specific principles than they are about preventing certain (non-coalition member) groups from rising in relative status:

Take the so-called "right wing." I believe that some people on the right do not like those they perceive as "whiners." They do not want these whiners to rise in relative status. That means they must argue against the whining and also they must argue against the presuppositions behind the whining.

Take the so-called "left wing." Some of these people favor a kind of meritocracy. They feel it is unfair that money so determines access in capitalist society and they do not want the monied class to rise in relative status, certainly not above the status of the smart people and the virtuous people. It is important to fight for the principle that the desires of this monied class have a relatively low priority in the social ranking. Egalitarianism is the rhetoric of the day, and readjusting the status of other Americans to the status of this monied class often receives more attention than elevating the very poorest in the world to a higher absolute level.



This excerpt doesn't really do the whole post justice, but I don't want to quote the entire thing. I think to a large extent Cowen is on to something here. Certainly, his theory goes a long way to explaining "pu-pu platter partisanship" (i.e., the holding of beliefs that apparently lack any discernible philosophical principle).

Where I think he goes (slightly) wrong is in articulating the ultimate goal of these group members as being to prevent certain groups from rising in status. Instead, I think the crux of the matter is simply that there is nothing that can hold a coalition together more than a perception of an imminent threat. An atmosphere in which the values or way of life of particular coalition members are "under attack" is an atmosphere in which those coalition members have great cause to fight back against those threats, especially by voting against the coalition that contains the source of those threats.

Importantly, if you have a perception that your way of life is under threat from the members of one coalition ("Party A"), then suddenly your primary goal in political life is to prevent "Party A" from gaining or holding on to power. The result of this, importantly, is that the voter/coalition member will become a dedicated voter of "Party B," as long as "Party B" is the coalition most capable of stopping "Party A." What matters, then, is not so much whether you agree with "Party B," but rather whether "Party B" is big enough to stop "Party A." It is a magnificent deterrent to voting for third parties; it is also a magnificent way of insulating the leadership of "Party B" from criticism by coalition members - it ceases to be particularly important that the leadership of "Party B" agree with its constituents, but is instead only important that the leadership of "Party B" is not "Party A."

In other words, if you feel threatened by "Group X" within "Party A," then you will support "Party B" so long as "Party B" claims to be against "Group X" and to want to restrict "Group X." You suddenly care less about keeping "Party B" honest and holding them to the fire when they deviate from principle than you care about supporting "Party B" because of your fear of what will happen if "Party A" maintains or obtains power. So you don't recognize or, at least, care enough to leave "Party B" when "Party B" does something that either actively hurts you or at least actively prevents you from achieving your policy goals.

The theory Cowen advances strikes me as being one in which politics for certain people is primarily a function of disdain for particular groups or a belief in which those groups are essentially beneath the coalition members of "Party B." I would instead characterize the issue as being one in which politics for these individuals is primarily a function of fear of, rather than disdain for, particular groups. This may only be a difference in semantics, as the effects of both characterizations are similar. But I think it's a noteworthy difference nonetheless.

Monday, July 28, 2008

All your stomachs are belong to us.

California's legislature banned trans fats in California restaurants. Gov. Schwarzenegger signed the bill. I have the libertarian animosity to this rights-violating action. What customers want doesn't matter, apparently. What restaurants want doesn't matter, apparently. That the two parties have managed to voluntarily co-exist until now doesn't matter, apparently.

This is paternalism at its ugliest. Customers are either the victim of malevolent businesses or too stupid to know better. Restaurants are that malevolent business. No other possibility exists there. They know trans fats are awful, AWFUL!, yet force them on customers anyway. Just evil.

That narrative is ridiculous. Customers are free to choose. As a vegan, personally, I'm well aware of how easy it is to not only ask about ingredients at any restaurant, but to also request substitutions. Restaurants, aka businesses, are interested in serving my needs to make money, not invested in shoving evil non-food down my throat whether I like it or not. This is just a lesson that any choice of narrative that relies on malevolent intent should be questioned often and diligently.

For contrast, Erik Marcus has a different opinion:

One parting thought: this was a campaign that no reasonable person could argue against. Thousands and thousands of lives will be saved, and the cost to industry is absolutely trivial. And yet the bastards behind the restaurant industry did everything possible to oppose this initiative.

I generally agree with Mr. Marcus' views, even where I often disagree on political solutions, but this is wrong. I suppose it's not for me to judge whether or not I'm a reasonable person, although I think I am. Mr. Marcus clearly disagrees. But I've explained briefly how a reasonable person can argue against a trans fat ban. And if it's not clear, I am arguing against a ban, not in favor of trans fats. The latter can be unhealthy without justifying the former.

I must also quibble with Mr. Marcus' projections. I do not necessarily disagree that "thousands and thousands" of lives will be saved. I doubt it, but I don't have evidence either way. For such a bold claim that is the basis for a denial of rights, I expect more than an expectation that I take it on faith. Show me the numbers, which will be only estimates. And once the ban is in effect, how long do we have to wait to see the change in life expectancy? How will we measure it? And if (when?) the projected benefits fail to appear, can we undo the ban?

The same applies to the assertion that the cost to industry is "absolutely trivial". I doubt that seriously, especially with all of the corresponding regulations already in place. (i.e. mandatory calorie/nutritional disclosure) There will be costs. What is the threshold for triviality? What about smaller businesses who don't have the buying power and monetary resources that larges businesses have? Is it a new maxim that a business may be large only when it makes it possible for the business to comply with new regulation?

These are reasonable questions that should be easy to answer if they're not based on misinformation and wishful thinking.

----------

From Ban Trans Fats, I found several interesting links. First, the push for voluntary compliance seems to have a few converts:

After we launched the trans fat campaign by filing the Oreo case in 2003, we started reporting on restaurants and other eateries that had switched to trans fat-free oil. Now in 2007 it is impossible to keep with all of the tens or hundreds of thousands of restaurants making the switch. We will continue to report when major chains make the switch.

You will notice lower down this page some small and even single restaurant operations are mentioned. These were "early adopters." We are keeping them on this page because they took the lead before the big companies made their moves.

Second, Bans Trans Fats offers a link called What Not to Eat, where it lists six rules for determining what not to eat.

In sixty seconds with The Google, I found enough information to make responsible choices. But I might not make those responsible choices for myself. Therefore, a ban. Don't worry, though. The original lawsuit was not about adults. It says so right there on the website, with underlining and an acknowledgment that adults can make their own intelligent choices. Think nothing of this text from the Ban Trans Fats site:

Nope, nothing to see there, folks. It's for the children only.

**UPDATE (by Mark)** John Schwenkler points out that trans fat bans aren't the attacks on corporate America that many like to think, but are instead a means for large corporate interests to insulate themselves from competition from smaller businesses that are less capable of adjusting to new regulatory requirements.

Monday, July 21, 2008

PSA: Hayek and Liberaltarianism

Just a quick PSA for those interested in a firmer understanding of the work of F.A. Hayek and it's implications for a liberal-libertarian coalition. Professor Steven Horwitz of St. Lawrence University will be the invited guest for a chat session at AOTP on Wednesday, July 30 at 7:00 PM EDT.

An excellent book review written by Professor Horwitz last year on the implications of Hayek for modern liberalism is here.

Thursday, July 17, 2008

The Stool Has No Legs

Writing at AOTP, FreeDem discusses the apparently curious electoral map that may be in the works for this fall, in which Obama could do far better than recent Dems in traditionally Republican areas like the Southeast and Mountain West, and far worse in traditionally Democratic areas like the Northeast.

To which I replied:

To me the most interesting thing about all this is the combination of Obama’s relative weakness in the Northeast and relative strength in the Mountain West. I’m not sure that Obama’s relative strength in the Southeast (outside of Virginia, which is a special case) will hold up in the end. But the numbers on the Northeast and Mountain West suggest that the coalitions are definitely shifting as the Republicans become officially the “anti-terruh” party rather than the party of the fabled “three-legged stool.” The Mountain West has tended to be Republican over the years mostly because of the libertarian-ishness of that region combined with the comparative strength of the
libertarian-conservative coalition. Obama’s strength in the Mountain West largely confirms what I’ve been saying for about a year now: the Republican-libertarian coalition is officially dead.

That said, there’s been a lot of talk that Obama’s support has decreased a bit the last couple of weeks. I haven’t seen much state-level polling in that period, but my suspicion is that the area where that support has dropped off the most is in the Mountain West states. If true, that would exemplify how and why Obama’s FISA vote was - contrary to conventional wisdom - bad politics that actually hurt him with more “independents” than it helped him with.

McCain’s strength in the Northeast (presumably not including Vermont and - maybe - New Hampshire) is largely attributable to the importance of the “anti-terrorism” issue in this area. This isn’t to say that the Northeast is necessarily a hotbed of support for the Iraq War, just that in recent years it has been far more willing to trade liberty for security (actually, that’s a pretty longstanding trend that largely predates 9/11- it’s safe to say that you’ll be hard-pressed to find two less libertarian states than NJ and NY).



The bottom line is that it's a tremendous mistake to think of the political map as being simply a divide between monolithic "red" states and "blue" states. That kind of thinking ignores the political reality that coalitions are ever-shifting, and just because the political map might look a particular way in one or two given elections there is no reason to believe that it will continue to look that way in future elections.

Wednesday, July 16, 2008

Good Intentions and the Path to Hell

Will Wilkinson, as is often the case, nearly made me fall out of my chair with this post. Money quote:

But simply dismissing the other team’s claims to moral conviction is way too convenient. It turns out that the Democratic party is also run by very, very wealthy people and interests. It also strikes me as lazy to assume that because the GOP isn’t beholden to various interest groups that claim to represent the working classes in the way the Democrats are, then the people with real power in the Republican party ipso facto have no sincere moral interest in the welfare of the working class. Yes, politics is a game of interests and coalitions. But coalitions often form around moral values. And people, even politicians, are moral beings and generally conceive of their interests in moralized terms.


This about hits it out of the park. I've said before that political coalitions tend to form around one or two umbrella BIG issues.* In the Republican Party right now, the BIG issue is quite clearly "national security" broadly defined. On the Dem side, though, the unifying issue is much more difficult to define. Probably the closest thing to a unifying issue is health care, but that is simply too specific an issue under which to form a broad coalition. Perhaps the party of the "little guy"? Not likely - as Wilkinson points out, the "little guy" is no more likely to be a Democrat than a Republican. On the whole, it's more likely that the Dem coalition is really now a coalition primarily united by several frequently overlapping, but far from mutually inclusive, sets of moral values: for instance, civil liberties (including civil rights), a less-aggressive foreign policy, and environmentalism.

I'd argue that the fact that coalition members on the Dem side do not all prioritize these moral values the same way gives rise to a party whose politicians are much more likely to lack discipline and unity as the politicians try to be all things to all coalition members. I'd also argue that the Dems have largely lacked a truly unifying umbrella issue since at least the end of the Cold War, maybe longer; the end of the Cold War had a similar effect on the Republican coalition, but the Contract for America cobbled it together again for a few years until 9/11 made national security THE unifying moral value for Republicans.

In any event, the nature of political coalitions is that they result in some very inconsistent policy-making (aka "pu-pu platter partisanship") while coalition members wind up honestly believing that the coalition's preferred policies are all completely consistent with, even necessary to, furthering the coalition's core moral values.


*These aren't issues upon which virtually every coalition member agrees, but rather are fundamental moral imperatives that serve to rally people into the coalition.

Tuesday, July 15, 2008

Four Legs Good, Two Legs Bad

There is an assumption in both conservative and libertarian circles that anything that the private sector is inherently better at doing things than the government. And on many things, this philosophy is, I think, correct (it is also something that liberals/Progressives agree with more than they get credit).

But where it gets tricky is when you get to the concept of "privatization" of various things. Libertarians and conservatives hear the root word "private" and they reflexively think that it is better than "public." But "privatization" is different from "free market," and in many cases "privatization" can mean the worst of all worlds.

For instance, if by privatization, you mean the contracting out of various government services and needs, you are often just asking for trouble. Why? Because this is a setup for the epitome of "crony capitalism." Sometimes, to be sure, this kind of "privatization" is a necessity in instances where the government is seeking to obtain products or services that it simply has no ability to provide on its own. Frequently, however, where the government is contracting out a product or service it already provides or can easily provide, this kind of "privatization" at best has the effect of doing no more than adding an extra layer of bureaucracy. At worst, though, it is an invitation for corruption and a particularly convenient means of avoiding government accountability. Far from allowing market forces to take over, this kind of privatization creates a market that would not otherwise exist, in which firms seek to please only one customer: the government. And contrary to popular belief, "the government" is not synonymous with "the people," but is rather more frequently synonymous with "elected and/or appointed government officials." What privatization does in this context is to make the purpose of the service provider to please the government official who awarded them the contract - not to offer "the people" with the best possible services at the lowest possible price. Oftimes, pleasing the responsible government official means nothing more than shielding the official from responsibility for the implementation of that official's policy preferences.

The other type of "privatization" that libertarians and market conservatives should fear is anything that suggests a public-private "partnership." Such partnerships all too often take the form of placing the risk of loss on the taxpayer while placing the benefits of profit on the private ownership side of the equation. To say the least, this creates frequently undesirable market distortions best exemplified by Amtrak, and, now, the collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

The bottom line is that "privatization" only works if it actually allows genuine, basic market principles to play out. Where "privatization" simply means that the government will seek to make purchases in a market that would not exist at all without the government intervention, it is a virtual guarantee that the "privatization" will result in no more and no less than something resembling the much-maligned and ever-expanding military-industrial complex. Where "privatization" means a "partnership" under which government agrees to back what would otherwise be a purely private entity, the government is both granting that company an unnatural market advantage and virtually begging that company to engage in really, really bad business practices. Finally, I would add that the manner in which government has incentivized employer-based health insurance is another example of a "public-private" partnership gone terribly wrong.

This isn't to say that "privatization" is always bad - far from it, and I remain a firm believer that market forces are the far superior manner of economic policy. Indeed, where "privatization" literally means the selling off of a government asset to the highest bidder, no strings attached, I would rarely disagree with it. But when it creates a situation where the entire raison d'etre of a firm is to serve the government or where the government has immunized the firm from market realities, the effects of privatization can often be worse than the disease.

The fact is that as between public ownership of an asset and the fictional "privatization" of that asset, I think public ownership is superior (again, if the choice is between public ownership and actual private ownership in a free market, then the free market wins hands down). At least where a service is entirely provided by the public sector, you know who to blame (and how to blame them) when things go wrong. In a representative democracy, this can be a non-trivial power. But when that service is provided by the private sector on behalf of the public sector, the question of who to blame and how becomes much more muddled....and frequently I suspect that's the point.

So as far as libertarian blind spots go, the belief in the private sector is often the "four legs good, two legs bad" of large segments of the libertarian movement.

Saturday, July 12, 2008

About that Freedom of the Press...

Libertarians know well that oftimes all that is necessary to restrict an essential freedom is the mere threat of force. So, for instance, to restrict political protests it is necessary only to arbitrarily arrest a handful of people in order to chill the willingness of others to protest - even if you release those you arrest without ever charging them with a crime.

Chris Hedges (Colgate '79) wrote an outstanding piece in the Friday LA Times that explains how the FISA bill passed this week, with its legalization of much of the President's warrantless wiretapping program, could have precisely that effect on the freedom of the press. To be sure, there are many things about which I disagree with Hedges in other contexts; but there should be no doubt that the man is a true journalist who is willing to place himself in harm's way in order to understand his subjects. Hedges writes:

" I contacted someone who was on the ship at the time of the alleged incident and who reportedly had photos. His first question was whether my phone and e-mails were being monitored. What could I say? How could I know? I offered to travel to see him but, frightened of retribution, he refused. I do not know if the man's story is true. I only know that the fear of surveillance made it impossible for me to determine its veracity. Under this law, all those who hold information that could embarrass and expose the lies of those in power will have similar fears. Confidentiality, and the understanding that as a reporter I will honor this confidentiality, permits a free press to function. Take it away and a free press withers and dies."


It is entirely possible - perhaps even likely - that Hedges is being a bit too apocolyptic about the effects of this bill. And in some contexts I disagree that confidentiality is necessary to a free press (I am largely opposed to reporter shield laws). But the thrust of his argument strikes me as deeply important, especially at a time when the "press," such as it exists for most Americans, has reached an almost unimaginable level of vacuity. There are relatively few quality journalists of note left who are capable of reaching a wide swathe of people; the FISA bill, to the extent it permits warrantless eavesdropping on the conversations of journalists, could well terminate a substantial portion of quality investigative foreign affairs journalism. Perhaps the bill is not the end of the world as we know it; but it certainly represents an infringement on civil liberties for a lot more than just "terrists."

Big H/T: Kathy at CFLF, whose work in recent weeks has consoled me over my grief at my friend Kyle's semi-retirement.

The Utilitarianism of Torture Chic

Responding to Matthew Yglesias' snippet on conservative torture fashion, Daniel Koffler at AOTP finds his outrage lacking:

"I say, let’s maximize the total utility of the world by making sure everyone who would “rather be waterboarding” has her preference realized. Indeed, if an appropriate form of utilitarianism is correct, one might have an obligation to
see to it that those who would “rather be waterboarding” get waterboarded."


As they say, read the whole thing (it's not very long).

...While I'm here I may as well throw out yet another plug for Art of the Possible, which is as interesting and unique a blog as they come (without being, you know, bizarre).

Also, John Schwenkler has some typically astute notes on this.

As for me, I agree with John that this view of waterboarding as being a criterion for modern-day conservatism must be fought vociferously by the dissident elements of conservatism. But I would add one thing - although this ideology of the political Right that views support for waterboarding as a litmus test is considered to be "conservative," the reality is that it is really just an example of how coalitions can distort the views of coalition members. Frankly, almost any truly conservative (in the Burkean sense) ideology - whether it be the conservatism of doubt of an Andrew Sullivan, the more traditional conservatism of a William F. Buckley or a Russell Kirk, etc. - would be disturbed by the concept of waterboarding as not only defensible but actually a badge of honor.

Instead, the idealization of waterboarding is merely a symbol of how "conservatism" has become viewed as simply a synonym for "agreeing with the Republican base," much as "liberalism" is viewed as synonymous with "agreeing with the Democratic base." In reality, however, actual conservatives were never more than one element of the Republican coalition, albeit the dominant element in the post-Goldwater era. The problem is that conservatives alone were not enough to win an election, and so the Republican party needed to seek out other groups who had relatively little philosophical connection with Buckley-style conservatism. To accommodate these groups, who took up the moniker of "______ conservatives," the Republican Party had to take up their issues, which were of perhaps lesser importance to the more philosophical conservatives.

Unfortunately, most people today - including most self-styled conservatives - view conservatism as an ideology that simply means "the dominant views of the random mish-mosh of groups supporting the Republican Party." This isn't conservatism - it's just pu-pu platter partisanship masquerading as conservatism. Moreover, it is perhaps exhibit A1 of how partisanship can have more impact on interest groups than interest groups have on the party (my fifth rule).

To be sure, there are a number of young, talented true conservatives (or not really Burkean "_______ conservatives") who are seeking to reclaim their philosophy from the jaws of political coalition pragmatism. But they will first have to develop and create support for those philosophies independent from the confines of either political party, especially the Republican Party. Given the synonymity of "conservative" with "Republican," I also suspect that they will have to come up with a new label for themselves to have much hope of success.

Thursday, July 10, 2008

Liberals won't leave us alone. (Conservatives won't leave us alone.)

Mark mentioned a few days ago, as he has many times, that he believes a left/libertarian alliance is coming. I think he's right, to an extent. It's coming, but I don't share his optimism about it, nor do I suspect it will last particularly long. For many of the qualifications he suggested, the Left is just a different form of the Right. Political gain matters more than any principle could ever matter, not that I think the far Left recognizes the rights libertarians understand. Any party with animosity to property rights - or an unprincipled willingness to bow to the blathering of constituents with animosity to property rights - isn't bound to keep a sizeable number of libertarians in the fold for very long.

Mark's proposition is worth pursuing in more detail, so I'm sure it'll be a theme for me, as well, as we get closer to the election. Here, I'm only going to explore a narrow piece of this question. A recent post by science fiction author John Scalzi on Bob Barr exposes my position a bit because I disagree with Mr. Scalzi's analysis. Or, rather, I think it's incomplete.

When Barr announced he would seek the LP nomination, Mr. Scalzi wrote about how Barr might affect McCain in the election. This is a worthy question, of course. I just don't think it's the entire equation, so I wrote a response raising the question of how Barr would change the vote for Sen. Obama. I stand by my assertion that it would matter. You can see my theory in action here with Mark's writing on the left/libertarian alliance.

I would never vote for Sen. McCain. (There was an unfortunate time when I bought the lies.) Sen. Obama should have no problem getting my vote. I've voted Democrat for president in every election since I turned 18. (Clinton, Clinton, Gore, and Kerry) I didn't consider myself a libertarian for the first three because I didn't realize I am a libertarian. My positions haven't changed, only my awareness of how they fit into the world and who among politicians supports them. I cared more about social issues than economic issues because I didn't have money to care about. The denial of equal rights for gays, for example, was clear to me in 1992. I'm not gay, but if another's rights could be denied, so could mine. That was always clear. I just didn't connect economics to property rights.

With the power of the Internets, more libertarians can now identify as libertarian and better understand how hostile liberals and conservatives are to much of what we care about. Any alliance going forward will fail to have the strength to stand as the conservative/libertarian alliance stood. They will have to change to meet us closer to where we are.

So, Barr versus McCain and Obama. Mr. Scalzi wrote a few days ago about how he donated his $6.10 stimulus check to the Barr campaign:

So what do you do with a stupid, frivolous amount of stimulus money? Well, you spend it on something stupid and frivolous, of course!

Bob Barr has about as much chance of being president as I have in getting a tomato plant to spontaneously erupt out of my forehead, but he does have a teeniest bit of a chance of peeling off just enough disgruntled GOPers to be a pain in John McCain’s ass come the general election, which at this point works for me as an ersatz protest vote and the GOP economic stewardship of the country (note that this statement will undoubtedly cause some delusional conservative/Republican to opine in the comments that it will be Obama whom Barr will peel voters off of, not McCain. Dear delusional conservative/Republican commenter: Just because you’re apparently huffing acetone from the inside of a paper bag doesn’t mean the rest of us are). That said, I don’t actually want to spend real money on Bob Barr; I don’t want anyone to get the idea he’s actually my guy, presidentially speaking. I mean, really. Speaking of huffing acetone. For what I want to do here, six dollars and ten cents is almost exactly the right amount to send the dude.

I am neither delusional nor conservative, yet I've made the argument that some votes for Barr will come from Obama's projected voters. I don't think I implied the numbers would be the same, which would make me delusional¹. They won't be because it is probably true that a majority of Barr's support from non-Libertarian Party members this year will be from conservatives/Republicans. But. There are libertarians who've pondered a vote for Sen. Obama because they would never vote for Sen. McCain and the current Republicans need to go. Now we may also consider a vote for Bob Barr. I am, in fact, considering it. And those numbers might be meaningful. If Democrats wish to prosper with libertarians, they'll consider it.

Ah, but I already said there's no way I would vote for Obama. Indeed. So what? I'm discussing the mindset of potential Barr voters in the context of a left/libertarian alliance. I think Obama is the lesser of two evils in this election, if barely. If I hadn't become so cynical skeptical, I'd follow my history and cast a vote for him. Yet, here I am considering a vote for Bob Barr. Yes, former Republican Bob Barr. That does not automatically mean I'm arriving from the right. There are many roads to Hell. This might be the scenic route worth taking.

I doubt I'll vote for Barr because I don't think he's genuine. However, since he will not win the presidency, a vote for him may be useful as a signal to both parties that libertarians exist. Which is what Mark is saying at the core of his argument, I think. Republicans have clearly abandoned the libertarian vote. Some progressives have made overtures about an alliance. Generally this has been "join us and you'll see how wonderful redistribution really is". Obviously we're not quite at an equitable alliance yet. A vote for Barr might signal that, while we're ready to mingle, we're not conceding our principles just to be in the new popular crowd.

The Democratic embrace of President Bush's unconstitutional warrantless wiretapping suggests they don't care about what libertarians care about.

¹ Not that I'm arrogant enough to imagine that Mr. Scalzi noticed my original entry, nevermind the possibility that this could be directed at me.

Tuesday, July 8, 2008

Proof in the Pudding

One final post for the day on centrism in light of today's Rasmussen polling data. The data show that over the last month and a half, Obama's "move to the center" has worked, at least insofar as it has resulted in significantly fewer people perceiving him as a "liberal" and more people perceiving him as a "moderate." But the data also helps to disprove the notion that "moving to the center" inherently increases a candidate's potential support. Comparing the change in the perception of Obama's "centrism" with Rasmussen's daily election tracking poll, you will see that Obama's lead over McCain has barely budged since Hillary Clinton dropped out of the Dem race on June 7- the entire time. Except for a few days in mid-June, Obama's lead (without leaners) has consistently been between 5 and 7 points and his overall (without leaners) support has held steady between 45 and 48 percent. If you include leaners, the analysis remains exactly the same.

Although I have no idea how much change there has been in the composition of Obama's 45-48 percent in that period, what is clear is that the increased perception of him as a "centrist" and the decreased perception of him as a "liberal" have done nothing to increase the overall size of his supporting coalition. And that is precisely the point of my previous posts decrying the utility of "centrism."

(Via memeorandum)

UPDATE: Chris Bowers at Open Left noticed the same thing.

The Center Will Not Hold

Perhaps not surprisingly, the topic of Obama's sudden "centrism" and its political value is getting some more attention today at memeorandum, at least regarding this Bob Herbert column. Herbert, more than most pundits, seems to understand that "moving to the center" is not necessarily a wise political move, writing, with respect to Obama that:

He seems to believe that his shifts and twists and clever panders — as opposed to bold, principled leadership on important matters — will entice large numbers of independent and conservative voters to climb off the fence and run into his yard.
Maybe. But that’s a very dangerous game for a man who first turned voters on by presenting himself as someone who was different, who wouldn’t engage in the terminal emptiness of politics as usual.


As much as my analysis in my essay this morning (I'd call it a must-read essay, but that would be too egotistical) applies as general political theory, it is probably particularly true of Obama, whose primary campaign and political style showed great promise as a vehicle for forging a new, more ideologically coherent coalition. I suspect that the result of Obama's "move to the center" will only be to more or less retain the existing coalition of the Dem Party by giving wavering coalition members (whose priority issues have perhaps faded in relevance to the Dem Party) a reason to remain in the coalition. In the process, though, it will also probably temper the enthusiasm that so many independents had for him. He'll still win in all likelihood, but if he does it will be a result of McCain's failure to generate enthusiasm from the established elements of the Republican coalition and the strong Dem fundamentals this year, much as the last several Presidential campaigns have largely been won by minimizing turnout from the opposing party's coalition base. That is something that no one, left, right, centrist, or otherwise, should be particularly happy about.